The prosecution of criminal suspects is an integral part of a country's justice system. While substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the police and judges and their relevance to the rule of law, surprisingly little is known about prosecutors. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap. We first demonstrate the necessity of our study by explaining the rising importance of prosecutors for criminal justice systems around the world. We identify the independence of these agencies from the other two branches of government as their most important characteristic and then proceed to analyze this independence from a political economy perspective. We subsequently discuss the possible determinants of the independence of prosecutors and describe how this independence can be measured in a crosscountry setting. Our empirical analysis sets out to test these determinants. In a first model we observe that some but not all the determinants of the independence of the judiciary are also among the factors that determine the independence of prosecutors. In a second model we extend our empirical investigation to also include specific de jure factors concerning the institutional arrangement of the procuracy in a country's criminal justice system. We conclude by formulating policy advice on how to strengthen the rule of law by better protecting the independence of these agencies.
Introduction
The prosecution of criminal suspects is an integral part of a country's justice system. Ideally, prosecutors -together with the police and judges -are central actors in implementing the rule of law. While substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the police and judges and their relevance to the rule of law, surprisingly little is known about prosecutors. This lacuna of research is not confined to the legal sciences but also extends into the economic analysis of law.
1 This is astonishing since all the actors making up the criminal justice value chain need to work together to effectively sustain the rule of law. Prosecutors link police investigation to court adjudication and have far-reaching decision-making powers over each criminal case. 2 In the overwhelming number of criminal justice systems, it is their responsibility to decide whether police investigations will lead to prosecution and, thus, whether courts will have the possibility to judge offenders at all. Prosecutors are, hence, agenda setters for judges and they have been referred to as the "judge before the judge" and "judge by another name". 3 Prosecutors formulate charges, conduct the prosecution and argue the case in court. If they disagree with the court's decision, they may typically appeal its ruling. 4 Recent developments have increased the importance of their independence even further: to relief strain from overloaded court systems, many jurisdictions have shifted powers and responsibilities from judges to prosecutors. In result, prosecutors are considered by some scholars as the potentially most powerful actors in the criminal justice system.
5
The aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap. We focus on what we consider to be the most important factor for the proper functioning of these agencies: their (in)dependence from the other two branches of government. Although the study of judicial independence is a well-established field, 6 the independence of prosecutors is not despite its high relevance for protecting the rule of law. Without this independence, the executive may exercise 1 Tonry, 2013 : 7 concludes on the lack of research in the legal sciences "[i]f prosecutors possess enormous power, as they do everywhere, and if they differ more greatly between jurisdictions than other criminal justice officials and agencies, as they do, we should want to know what differences those differences make. We don't." Garoupa, 2012: 239 calls "the economics of prosecutors (..) largely underdeveloped" and provides an overview of the limited research in this field. 2 Luna, et al., 2012b : 1. 3 Weigend, 2012 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2000: 4. See also Tonry, 2013: 1; Luna, et al., 2012a : xi. 5 Weigend, 2012 . See also Jehle, et al., 2006 . 6 Voigt, et al., 2015 is just one recent example.
undue influence over prosecutors to protect government members, interest groups and supporting elites from criminal prosecution or, on the contrary, use its influence over prosecutors to repress citizens, businesses and political opposition if such behavior promises to enhance its own goals.
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In a study analyzing the effects of both the de jure as well as the de facto independence of prosecutors, van Aaken et al. (2010) find that these two notions of independence are negatively correlated: the higher the independence of prosecutors according to the law, the lower their actual independence. 8 This finding is puzzling. In their paper, van Aaken et al. suspect that countries witnessing important governance problems (such as high corruption levels) might be encouraged to modernize their criminal procedural law leading to high levels of de jure independence but that nothing much is changed on the ground, implying low levels of de facto independence. In this paper, we take up the puzzle by inquiring more systematically into the determinants of the de facto independence of prosecutors. In our empirical analysis, van Aaken et al.' s data on the de facto independence of prosecutors serves as our dependent variable. We model this data in two stages: as a starting point we broadly apply the theoretical framework that Hayo and Voigt (2007) developed in their study on the determinants of the de facto independence of the judiciary to the procuracy. 9 We observe that some but not all the determinants of the independence of the judiciary are also among the factors that determine the independence of prosecutors. In a second stage we extend our investigation and also include specific de jure factors concerning the institutional arrangement of the procuracy in a country's criminal justice system to our model. By making an explicit distinction between factors that are subject to policy measures and those largely exempt from government influence, the results of this study promise to be highly policy.
The paper is structured as follows. We first demonstrate the necessity of our study by explaining the rising importance of prosecutors for criminal justice systems around the world (Section 2).
We subsequently identify the independence of these agencies as their most important
characteristic and then proceed to analyze it from a political economy perspective (Section 3). In Section 4 we discuss the possible determinants of the independence of prosecutors; Section 5 describes how this independence can be measured in a cross-country setting. Our estimation 4 strategy and empirical results are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. We conclude with a summary of how our research contributes to the study of prosecutors and formulate policy advice on how to strengthen the rule of law by better protecting the independence of these agencies (Section 8).
The Rising Importance of Prosecutors for Criminal Justice
While the core functions and responsibilities of the police and judiciary are similar in all developed countries, those of prosecutors traditionally varied fundamentally. 10 Comparative research on prosecutors is thus challenging and this may explain why such research is even scarcer than research on prosecutors in national settings. 11 Prosecuting agencies do not only differ in their institutional and organizational set-up, but also on a more fundamental level, namely in regard to the general principles according to which they operate. In some countries, prosecutors traditionally had to prosecute cases strictly according to the applicable rules ("legality principle") and they have only limited individual discretion over how to handle cases. This holds true for Germany and many other continental European civil law countries. In other countries, prosecutors have broader decision making powers ("expediency principle" or "opportunity principle") that extend to whether and how to prosecute a given case. This is true for the U.S. and all other Anglo-Saxon common-law countries.
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However, nowadays these fundamental differences between worldwide prosecution authorities are diminishing. In response to an ever increasing case load, 13 policy makers have implemented measures that have led to a softening of this traditionally strict divide. In principle, the following three main policy options can be implemented to deal with overloaded criminal justice systems:
(1) increase the size and the funding of the entire system, (2) decriminalize less serious offences that are thenceforth, for example, only dealt with under administrative rather than criminal law and finally, (3) increase the powers of the prosecution authorities to handle incoming cases more 10 Tonry, 2013: 2-4. 11 Luna, et al., 2012a: xi. 12 Tonry, 2013: 7-12. 13 Consider the example of Western Europe. Since the 1950s crime rates have significantly increased, even though in some countries this growth trend recently came to an end or slightly reversed. Jehle, 2006: 5. See also Eurostat, 2015a; Eurostat, 2015b. autonomously from judges and the court system. 14 The last option has been chosen by many
Western countries. Also jurisdictions that traditionally adhered to the legality principle implemented it and thus gave more discretionary powers to prosecutors. 15 As a result, in many jurisdictions around the world the importance of prosecutors for criminal justice has steadily increased.
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Frequently, prosecutors are now not a simple intermediary between the police and the courts who decide whether or not a case that has been investigated should also be prosecuted. Instead, the powers of prosecutors extend well beyond these core responsibilities. Under certain circumstances, prosecutors may single-handedly decide whether a criminal sanction will be imposed. They may also determine, or negotiate with the offender, of what kind and how serious this sanction will be. 17 To illustrate, consider the example of the U.S., where prosecutors' powers are particularly pronounced. Here, the vast majority of all criminal convictions (95% or more)
result from plea bargaining agreements between defendants and prosecutors. In this system prosecutors -not judges-determine the charges and the sentences to be imposed for a large majority of cases. Many other countries have broadly comparable mechanisms in place that have shifted decision-making powers from judges to prosecutors and have thus amplified their powers. 18 The example of Germany demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion is also present in countries that traditionally adhered to the legality principle. According to some calculations, about 90% percent of all cases in which the police had identified a suspect and that were thus declared as "resolved" never went to court in Germany. Instead, prosecutors relied on a variety of case ending options the use of which is only subject to minimal external review.
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In this section, we have described that over the last couple of decades ever more powers have shifted towards prosecution agencies. Up to today, scholarly attention has not followed this shift of power from judges to prosecutors, possibly due to the complexity involved in comparative research on prosecution authorities.
14 Jehle, 2006: 5-6 . 15 Economic considerations are not the only justification for increasing prosecutors' discretionary powers. Among other reasons, a concern for individualized justice can also justify such an increase. Weigend, 2012: 384. 16 Weigend, 2012: 383-389 . See also Jehle, et al., 2006 . 17 Weigend, 2012 . 18 Tonry, 2013: 5-9 . See also Luna, et al., 2012a : xi and xvii. 19 Weigend, 2012: 384-385 .
The Relevance of the Independence of Prosecutors for Ensuring the Rule of Law
In this section, the importance of prosecutorial independence for implementing the rule of law is discussed. Prosecutors and judges can be considered as part of a single value chain producing justice: whereas prosecutors collect information on the case and represent "the public interest", it is the task of the judges to question the reliability of the information provided by both suspect and prosecutor and reach a final decision based on that evidence. Due to this interplay between prosecutors and judges, securing a high level of de facto judicial independence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for producing criminal justice. Prosecutors also need to be independent, otherwise some cases might never appear in court, relevant information will not be provided and so on. In what follows we discuss why a government would at all want to infringe the independence of prosecutors and why the protection of this independence is thus crucial to the rule of law. We show that from the viewpoint of government, undercutting the independence of prosecutors may even be more attractive than undercutting the independence of the judiciary. We argue that the former action may lead to less opposition and may, hence, be less costly for government.
The executive can exercise influence on the judiciary and the prosecution agency for various reasons. Among these we can broadly distinguish between two types of objectives. First, the government may want to end a legitimate criminal proceeding against one of its members or members of the supporting elites. Second, the executive may want to initiate an illegitimate criminal case to tarnish the reputation of any kind of opponent or even wrongfully convict him or her. No matter which of these objectives the government pursues, it has various methods at its disposal to realize them. To name a few consider positive incentives such as bribes, salary increases, promotions, etc. or negative disincentives such as salary cuts, demotions, disciplinary transfers, forced retirements, etc. These methods may vary in their effectiveness to produce the desired outcome and the costs that they inflict on government. The costs are thereby tantamount to the intensity of the political and social opposition that these governmental actions will evoke.
We argue that generally speaking, the costs resulting from the application of these methods are always higher if they are applied to judges rather than the prosecuting authority. Infringing judicial independence is a governmental action that is more visible and thus also more easily detectable than a comparable action aimed at the prosecution authority. It is therefore also likely to lead to fiercer resistance. From the point of view of government, exercising influence on the prosecution authority may therefore lead to comparable results at lower costs than using the same means against the judiciary and is thus an appealing option. To illustrate consider the following examples.
Ending a Legitimate Criminal Case
Consider a scenario where there is a legitimate criminal case whose regular prosecution is against the interest of government. For example, a member of government or a supporter of that government has engaged in a criminal activity such as corruption and this activity got subsequently detected. Let us first examine the outcome of this scenario assuming that the independence of the prosecution agency is guaranteed and then alter the scenario assuming that independence is infringed upon.
Scenario A: The Independence of Prosecutors is Protected
In this scenario, the prosecutor would supervise and direct police investigations to detect the most incriminating evidence. Once the preliminary investigation has led to sufficient evidence, the prosecutor may decide whether the case should go to trial or if she wants to choose another case ending option that she deems adequate. If she decides to go to trial, she will present the incriminating evidence, argue the case as convincingly as possible and call for a sentence that she considers appropriate. Assuming that the prosecution agency enjoys de facto independence but the judges do not, government can only stop the criminal case once it has reached the court stage.
However, from the perspective of both the criminal and the supporting government much damage has been done already at this point. The incriminating evidence is now available to a broader audience. Any infringement of judicial independence will thus become easily visible. Attempts to cover up such governmental actions or to mediate their consequences, for example by convincing the political and social opposition of the innocence of the criminal or hiding the outcome of the case from the public altogether will now be challenging. Consequently, any undue influence on the judge to dismiss a legitimate case once it has been brought by an independent prosecutor to the court stage will come at a high cost for the executive.
Scenario B: The Independence of Prosecutors is Infringed
Now consider the same criminal case with modified assumptions. Assume that the executive can infringe the independence of the prosecuting agency. In this scenario, a government that aims to influence the outcome of the case would not wait until it has reached the court stage. The government would rather try to exercise influence on the case as early as possible in the criminal justice value chain. Supposing that the government is successful, the case might never reach the court, for instance, because the prosecutor was sufficiently unsuccessful in finding incriminating evidence etc. The prosecutor could also choose the most favorable pretrial case ending option that is available to her with the aim of letting the criminal go with no or minimal sanctions and thus prevent the case from ever being heard in court. If it turns out to be impossible to prevent the case from going to trial, the prosecutor can still try to conceal incriminating evidence and plead for a very light sentence in court. Under these circumstances, even an independent judge would have a hard time to come up with an appropriate judgment. If the judge nevertheless sentences the criminal, the sentence is likely to be less harsh than would be appropriate. Furthermore, if government decides to also infringe the independence of the judge this would now come at substantially less costs when compared to a scenario in which the prosecutor is independent.
There has been less incriminating evidence made public and the prosecutor's favorable statement of the case would make it harder for the public to detect the infringement of the judicial independence and the subsequent biased judgement. Thus the costs resulting from infringing the independence of the judiciary are much lower than they would be if the prosecutors had been independent.
Initiating an Illegitimate Criminal Case
Finally, consider a scenario where the executive does not want to end a legitimate criminal proceeding but is, rather, interested in a meritless prosecution because it intends to weaken somebody, for instance a politician of the opposition. We can distinguish between two variants of 20 Not all meritless cases brought by prosecutors are the result of unduly government influence, however. There might very well be cases that are being brought by prosecutors on their own initiative, e.g., due to ideological zeal.
Cost Considerations
We can conclude that to produce some of the outcomes that government wishes to see, infringing the independence of the prosecution authority is a necessity. In cases in which government could alternatively infringe upon the independence of the judiciary, cost considerations will usually lead to prefer infringing upon the independence of the prosecution agency. The decision to infringe the independence of the prosecution authority is thus largely motivated by the desire to reduce the costs connected to an infringement of the criminal justice system. The total costs that result from such an infringement are made up of two elements: firstly, the costs resulting from carrying out the infringement. Legal and organizational factors that stand against this action will thus increase costs and lead to a greater independence of prosecutors. Secondly, costs resulting from the probability that the illegitimate governmental intervention gets detected and will thus subsequently evoke political and social resistance. The existence of factors that are likely to amplify political and social resistance against an infringement are thus factors that will foster the independence of prosecution agencies. Based on these considerations in the next section we derive empirically testable hypothesis on the determinants of the independence of the prosecution authorities.
Factors Influencing the Independence of Prosecutors
In this section, we develop a number of conjectures regarding factors that may influence the independence of prosecutors. Why may this independence at all be infringed? Governments may try to exercise undue influence on prosecution agencies for various reasons. For example, governments may force prosecuting agencies to initiate proceedings against political opponents if this promises to stabilize or even increase their power. Political opponents may be charged of crimes they knowingly never committed simply to ruin their reputation or to hinder their political ambitions. Governments may also force prosecutions against private parties and businesses if this helps to foster their own political agenda. Private parties' political opposition or their human rights activities and businesses' support of such political opposition are some examples of activities that a malicious government may want to suppress. Prosecutions against businesses may also be initiated to advance the economic interest of the government members or their constituents. Finally, governments may exercise influence on prosecution agencies to stop lawful prosecutions of crimes such as corruption or any other abuse of public office that their members committed or any other crime that their constituents committed. We now hypothesize which factors may prevent governments from infringing the independence of their prosecuting authorities in these ways. We argue that governments will only permanently refrain from these infringements if the costs of such actions exceed any possible benefits they may gain.
As a starting point for discussing the determinants of the de facto independence of prosecutors, a review of the literature on the independence of the judiciary is helpful. Above, we have pointed out the differing scopes of responsibility but also the complex interplay between judges and prosecutors in a criminal justice system. Some of the determinants of the independence of the judiciary may be equally relevant to the independence of prosecutors and shall thus be included in our analysis after due consideration. Hayo and Voigt (2007) are open to such an intervention (e.g. form of government, the degree of press freedom granted and the level of de jure judicial independence). We adopt Hayo and Voigt's differentiation for our presentation of the determinants of the independence of prosecutors as one of the aims of our study is to provide policy advice. The formulation of such an advice can only be sensible for factors that are actually subject to governmental intervention. In the regression models presented below the following variables were scaled down to ease the visibility of their coefficients.
Measuring the Independence of Prosecutors
In this section of the paper, we briefly summarize van Aaken et al.'s (2010) indicators that we employ to measure the de facto and the de jure independence of prosecutors. 22 The indicators are index variables that summarize a large variety of measures for the different aspects of this independence. All items that contribute to the de jure independence of prosecution agency index can be found in legal documents, whereas the items that contribute to the de facto index are concerned with the factual implementation of these legal texts. The countries that were included in the dataset for a number of reasons do not constitute a random sample. As the employed research design does not allow us to easily solve this selection problem, we have to account for it in the interpretation of our results. To assess the de facto independence, an index variable based on up to seven items was constructed. Each of these items can take on values between 0 and 1,
where greater values indicate a higher degree of independence. The index is available for seventy-six countries. 23 In our models, these sub-indices allow us to test for the influences of specific aspects of the independence of prosecutors. 
Results
We model our data in two stages: as a starting point we broadly apply the theoretical framework that Hayo and Voigt (2007) developed in their study on the determinants of the de facto independence of the judiciary to the procuracy. 24 We observe that some but not all the determinants of the independence of the judiciary are also among the factors that determine the independence of prosecutors. In a second stage we extend our investigation and also include specific de jure factors concerning the institutional arrangement of the procuracy in a country's criminal justice system to our model. The Results allow us to formulate policy advice in order to strengthen the independence of prosecutors. 
